To What Extent Does a Nation Require a State?
31439 – Nationalism Today
Dr Klaus-Jürgen Nagel
Sisheng Chris Zhang, Universitat Pompeu Fabra MA Political Philosophy
For David Miller, nations and state are necessary to each others’ conceptions. “Nation’ must refer to a community of people with an aspiration to be politically self-determining, and ‘state’ must refer to the set of political institutions that they may aspire to possess for themselves.”1. Put differently, the way in which people govern (e.g., state) can only be applied to themselves (e.g., co-nationals); and for a nation to be recognised as one, it has to show its ability to self-determinate. Thus, in Miller’s conception, the notions of nation and state are mutually dependent.
Miller’s conception of the nation-state is problematic for the state can dominate over a nation. As the state possess coercive power, those do not identify themselves as a part of the nation, for example, are still subjected to the control of the state. To be sure, Miller rejects that states can be used to “imposed national culture on people who may resist it.” 2. Nonetheless, the necessity of a functioning state in a nation ground many possibilities of such violation towards one’s even if the state is not permitted to do so on a normative level.
State control is effective, and this can be a reason for one to join a particular nation. But the effective state is no reason to assume that it is necessarily the only source in which co-nationals can self-determinate. The claim that nation and state are mutually dependent might mean that these two elements are sufficient to the development of each other, but it does not follow from logic that a state is required. In many cases, people do not, or are in no position to choose their state. If the notion of national self-determination means the collective of individual self-determination3, with culture more likely to be chosen (and state-less so) by an individual, a true notion of national self-determination should take more seriously the notions that co-nationals can genuinely, and reasonably self-determinate.
This essay argues that a nation, on its own, can be self-determinating without the need of a deliberate agency such as the state. For Miller, the state is one of three propositions embodied by a nation. I argue that the state is not necessary for a nation. My argument rests largely on a cultural aspect of a nation: that co-nationals share a largely similar (if not the same) culture. A shared culture, I believe, can generate sufficient normative force for the purpose of social solidarity that help encouraging national self-determination. From the analyses of Brian Barry, Samuel Scheffler, and Seyla Benhabib, I argue that the grounding of culture is a more sensible ideal comparing to Miller’s political proposition.
This essay will proceed in three parts: firstly, I shall debunk Miller’s argument and his foundation of the political proposition, and argue that people’s self-determination need not entail a necessary stablishment of a state; Secondly, I examine the arguments of Brian Barry and Benhabib, and sketch a plausible cultural proposition in place of Miller’s original political proposition; Thirdly, I turn to Samuel Scheffler’s account on culture and tradition, and argue for a plausible basic normative framework within culture that does not require external interference such as the state. Before the end, I respond to Scheffler’s objections to my proposal.
Nation-State in Miller
Nationality encompasses three propositions: 1) Identity, 2) Ethical Community (EC), and 3) Political. Identity “claims that it may properly be part of someone’s identity that they belong to this or that national groups.”4. Identity need not be constitutive of one’s personal identity 5, what is sufficient is his subjective knowledge: e.g., he feels that belongs to this nation, rather than another. EC states that nations are ethical communities”6, meaning that “proper account of ethics should give weight to national boundaries”7. Importantly, EC does not mean no moral obligation to those from outside of the country, rather, it merely means that our duties toward those in our national territory are weightier. Political:
“…states that people who form a national community in a particular territory have a good claim to political self-determination; there ought to be put in place an institutional structure that enables them to decide collectively matters that concern primarily their own community.”8
For Miller, Political does not mean that an institutional approach is the only way to illustrate national self-determination9. Following Miller’s definition, I call the institution(s) in which nationals self-determinate as a state10.
However, the conception of state tells us very little about its relationship with its members. What we know from Miller is that a state is important for national self-determination, it is one of the propositions of nationality. And as far as people reach a genuine collective decision to construct a state, per se, this seems reasonable11. However, it seems bizarre if people, through no fault of their own, become and, more importantly, remain subjects to a state (that they did not participate in deliberating its construction). Two distinctions can be made about people in this situation: compliant, and non-compliant. Compliant refers to those who choose to abide by the state. For example, people that are born after the establishment of the state’s basic structure have less power to deliberate in politics than their predecessors (who are responsible for the creation of such state). The point here is that the constraints on their liberty is not imposed by themselves12. This is hardly self-determining. On the other hand, non-compliance refers to those refuse to abide by the state. In both cases, the existing state does not reflect their self-determination. Compliant people abide by the state non-willingly13 while non-Compliant people unwillingly abide some of the state’s demands. If we take Miller’s political proposition seriously, it seems that we have to rule-out those that do not satisfy the political proposition as non-nationals. This seems counter-intuitive, and again, not self-determining.
To help us see the problem more clearly, we might invoke the notion of consent. In both Compliant and non-Compliant, there is no (explicit) consent14. Assuming that there is no explicit consent from co-nationals, one might turn to the tacit consent, that, in virtue of his nationality, the consent to be subjected to be govern is assumed by this state. However, this assertion is too quick, not many people (or perhaps no-one) is capable of voluntarily decide on their nationality. The debate on consent has a rich philosophical background and is still heavily entangled. But what is important here, in light of liberal ideals, is that we ought to honour individual choices to the best of our ability and according to justice15. Notwithstanding the lack of consent we can get from co-nationals to the state, we still have weighty reasons to take seriously the decision that one has in his culture that he reasonably deliberates.16 Mere subjection to (bad) luck is no excuse for lack of rectification for future injustice.
Note, in making my argument, I do not reject Miller’s political presupposition but merely the necessity of which to ground national self-determination. I concede with Miller that self-determination is significant for a nation, even in cases where not everyone participates in the deliberative process of national self-determination. One can reasonably choose not to participate in deliberation process as his preferences differ from that of another due to the possession of different values17. Nonetheless, my discussion above flags-up two points:
- Political can be demanding, as it concerns only those that are responsible for the constructing the state;18
- Given the lack of consent, one’s subjection can only be trivially related to self-determination of his nation.
Thus, to establish nationality using self-determination, we require a stronger basis comparing to Political that takes more seriously one’s reasonable individual self-determination. In the next section, I shall outline what I call the cultural proposition, which seems to be a better way to capture, and honour people’s individual deliberation.
Motivating a Cultural Proposition
For David Miller, a cultural approach “…pose(s) a problem for the principle of nationality”19 for the vast amount of identities will dilute, or cloud that of the national one20. National identities might collapse into ethnical identities21. From a liberal perspective, the self-affirmed identity is not itself a problem for reflecting self-determination; instead, the problem lies with the different political connotation that each identity embodies.22 If one does not assign importance to his national identity, for example, his political ambition might be to serve the interests from his other identities, not necessarily for the sake of national self-determination. For example, a Christian who attributes importance only to his religious identity means that all of his political deliberation will be used only to serve his religion identity, giving attention to no other contexts. 23
Before moving onto my arguments, it is important to bridge the gap between normativity and self-determination. In the following sections, I shall show, only, that culture can generate sufficient normative forces for people’s self-determination. Nonetheless, it might be argued that even if culture can be responsible for normativity that has certain demand on people’s action, it does not quite follow that self-determination is present in the process. I disagree. Certainly, no-one can be responsible for their background into which they are born, cultural or state. But this, on its own, is not a reason to assume that impossibility of self-determination at all, or the opposite-the necessity of self-determination24. My arguments rest firmly on the cost of choosing alternatives. While it might be true that both culture and state are imposed onto people, and that all options embody certain non-voluntariness25, it seems that the cost to choose another culture is much lower than opting-for another state. The cost is high in deliberating between states, partially because of the retribution that the state can impose on him (should one violate its regulation); while this seems less so in the case of culture: culture is a more open arena in which people have more flexibility to express their beliefs. Even if one does not enjoy the culture which he is in (and is reluctant to change for some reasons), how he chooses to cope with the existing culture begs for his individual self-determination. Self-determination is one’s response to normative demands imposed on him. Cultural normativity does not equal to self-determination, but it is nevertheless a great way to prompt so. In any case, self-determination is more desperately needed when people are unsatisfactory about the normative demand imposed on them, and less so when there is none. Political explicit rejects imposing a state onto co-nationals because the state needs to be the result of national self-determination. But there is no guarantee. In this case, it seems, the slight pressure from culture is more suited encouraging self-determination.
In this section, I construct an account that enables people’s self-determination to take place from the culture. I engage, firstly, with the liberal’s inability to value every culture equally as liberals; secondly, I show how a cultural approach need not assume a relativist standpoint; Finally, I shall sketch the possibility of how culture can encourage self-determination as it is necessarily distinctive. Together, these three points will clarify some common misunderstandings about the culture and establish how culture can be normative.
Firstly: Barry agrees with John Gray that if liberal value pluralism entails “uncombinability and incommensurability of values,” then, “neither liberal rights nor the democratic objects have any special status.”26. More importantly, for Barry, this statement not only means that we cannot utilise our judgements on the values not of our own; but it also cannot resort to claiming that no position is better/worse, for this inevitably invoke a comparative analysis that fundamentally contradicts with the liberal ideology.27 Put simply, not only can liberals not value every culture as equals, but also that liberals cannot value any culture at all28.
Secondly: many find cultural argument cyclical, that, the value of certain things can only be rightly perceived in particular cultural context; this makes criticism very difficult (if not impossible). Indeed, it seems that “the appeal to ‘culture’ constitutes some sort of justification in and of itself.”29. Indeed, it is usually claimed by cultural relativist’s that “this is the way we do things here.”30 However, Barry argues against Taylor’s notion and claim that “…we do things that way here not because it is a part of our culture but because it is the right thing to do.”31 He believes that our value judgement is of importance only because of the social context that we are in, “(i)n a liberal society, there would be nothing award in imposing liberal norm and protecting Rushdie from death threats; but in another society there would…be nothing awkward in executing him.”32. Thus, the fact that culture normally carries a relativist connotation is defused by Barry, for he believes that different cultures have different weights in values. That a culture finds certain value important does not mean that other culture, necessarily, cannot concede so. It could, however, mean that the culture does not subscribe the same level of importance to this very value, comparing to one that does. For example, murdering is wrong in a context because it violates one’s right to life; in a cultural context where the notion of human right is less weighty, murdering is wrong for another reason (e.g., that it arbitrarily terminate one’s life for the purpose of only the murder’s gain)33. In both cases, we find murdering wrong. But the reason for thinking so differs drastically from one culture to the next. Thus, even if it is said that cultures sometimes resort to the internal justification of reasons for action, this, itself, does not mean that the outcome of deliberation of one culture necessarily differs to that of another culture.34 More importantly, cultural deliberation is not relativistic.
Finally, Benhabib believes that:
“We should view human cultures as constant creations, recreations, and negotiations of imaginary boundaries between “we”‘ and the “other(s).” The “other” is always also within us and is one of us. A self is a self only because it distinguishes itself from a real, or more often than not imagined, “other.”35
To establish one’s identity, it is necessary for us to see what is distinctive of different people/groups. We require cultural dialogues to understand what is inherently distinct about us, comparing to other groups of people, “’Complex cultural dialogue’ is not only a sociological reality but also an epistemological vantage point with methodological implications for social science and moral inquiry.”36 We see the need to understand the notion of culture more fully (and refrain from resorting to philosophical reductionism) by mean of engaging in cultural dialogues because culture is embedded in different cultural discourses. If Benhabib is right: a clearer understanding towards any culture not only act as an explanation for that culture, but also help others to better understand their own cultures (e.g., liberalism). A culture, therefore, is of normative importance to all humans. When we disagree with practices in other cultures, our disagreement comes not only from our understanding of that culture but also the understanding of our own culture. From our culture, we generate value judgements; while quite possibly, we can also examine the normativity of our culture. All can achieve without invoking the illiberal better/worse judgement about another culture, or the judgment on the value of any culture. Co-nationals in this case self-determinate by looking at the differences between different cultures and choose what is the better for them. However, the reason for doing so is not because how another culture is superior/worse than theirs, but simply because this is right for their own culture.
How can Culture be Sufficiently Normative?
Thus far, I showed that culture could carry certain normative force which facilitates our self-determination. But this does not mean that the force is sufficient (such that we can withdraw the need for a state). This section shows how the culture’s normative force could be sufficient in virtue of basing on a tradition.
According to Samuel Scheffler, the reasons in support of tradition are normative37. “To subscribe to or participate in a tradition just is to see the fact that it calls for certain actions as reasons for performing those actions.“38 He provides seven reasons with which we value tradition39: “convention, habit, wisdom, guidance, value, loyalty, and integrity.”40. For him, tradition fulfils the same functions per personal routines, from which we benefit highly. Personal routine is important as it serves three purposes: 1) compensate for the lack of control over our temporal mobility41, 2) domesticate time42, and 3) confirm our reality as temporally extended beings43. Thus, tradition is important for us as a source of familiarity in the estranged and inevitable future.
Also, tradition is also important as many people wish to feel a part of something larger than themselves.”44. If this is the case, then, for Scheffler, we need to account for reasons why 1) people care for themselves (or, our group) and 2) people identify ourselves with the current group but not others45. For Scheffler, that people care about something larger than ourselves naturally extends beyond one’s life46, “for traditions are repositories of value, and are themselves objects of value, and the wholee point of a tradition is perpetuate the survival of what people value: to hand these values down from generation to generation.”47. In other words, tradition is timeless, in the sense that, if tradition decays, it is not because of the currently uncontrollable/unstoppable lapses of time but because of the deliberate choice of all generations of people that embody it. A tradition that is active in any generation is a crystallisation of everything that has happened to it in generations prior to this one; with elements that are most valuable being condensed and purified, and elements that are problematic discarded, or altered. Thus, modification of the tradition by any generation is reasonable and meticulous. Tradition modification is reasonable for it compares and contrast with other competing values active in the current generation; it is meticulous because the tradition is cared for by all the previous generations, as such, it is important for any change to reflect most genuinely of the tradition for the future generation. Tradition, then, is perhaps the most important source of normativity for culture. Any generation of people choose how, and to what extent they prefer to adopt the tradition. As suggested, all participation in tradition carries profound influence for the current peoples as well as for the future generations inheriting the tradition. Now, if tradition forms a part of a culture, it seems that we have a very solid ground on which we may find that culture is sufficiently normative.
For Scheffler, tradition differs from culture48, as the reasons in support for culture are not normative49. In addition, culture differs from moral, religion, and philosophical convictions for it is “not in the same sense sources of normative authority, for they are not explicitly justificatory structures at all.”50 There are two reasons contributing to Scheffler’s understanding:
- “Culture does not have a uniform normative outlook, and many cultures exhibit a high degree of moral, religious, and philosophical diversity.”51;
- Culture norms and values are descriptive, rather than normative: “…to classify something as a cultural norm or value is not to characterise its perceived authority but merely to indicate that a certain group of people subscribes to it.”52;
For him, that cultural reasons are not considered as normative reason is because they “do not constitute a special class of norm- or value-based considerations over and above the various norm- and value-based considerations that agents already recognise.”53
I shall respond to these points here. Firstly, I see no reason to assume that culture requires “uniform normative outlook”54 for the difference between culture is precisely that they are not uniform. In some cultures, the emphasis on religion is more; while in others, perhaps more so on ethnicity. There is no right or wrong way to view a culture; this is because, by judging so, this person already conforms to a set of values with the weight of which offered by his culture. Drawing from Barry, what culture provides is not the definitive answer of what our values ought to be; rather, it is the weight of different types of values. This does not entail 1) that a culture necessarily overlooks a type of value (e.g., religious) without good explanation; or 2) that values, per se, are imposed onto individuals. Being a member of a liberal nation means that his value judgement (affected by the cultural context) is heavily influenced by certain liberal ideologies, but this need not be causally related that he actually believes in these liberal ideals; rather, it merely means that the nation’s influence over this individual: a particular weighted combination of different values, in fact, form the basis on which he can raise reasonable objections.
Secondly, I concede with Scheffler that culture is frequent in our discourse with the purpose of identification, but this is not the only purpose it serves. When one voluntarily identifies with a particular culture, he does so not because of, say, mere admiration; rather, he does so according to his sense of belonging. If this is the case, then, that one’s realisation of his culture belonging requires a comparative assessment of his own values and that of the host culture’s. More importantly, I believe, even in a case where one did not choose to opt-out from a particular culture requires his self-determination on the situation. For example, that one did not opt out a culture might still be a result of his deliberation: e.g., that being a part of any culture is better than not being a part of any culture. Being reasonable in the liberal state does not mean that one, necessarily, has to deliberate in every situation possible. Scheffler further writes, “Cultures survive only by changing: by accumulating and interpreting and producing new ideas and experiences. ”.55. For him, it is a mistake to hold culture constant. However, Scheffler’s claim does not influence the claim of normativity for culture. In the contemporary world, where immigration is a common phenomenon across the globe, changes take place in not only the immigrants’ cultures but also that of the host country56. However, after rejecting the strong preservation viewpoint by Scheffler himself57, I see no space in which we can reasonably restrict or regulate on the extent to which a culture can change58. One can reasonably value (and preserve) culture only instrumentally and not intrinsically. In this case, reasonable people value culture, for example, because it provides a sense of belonging, facilitates inter-personal relationships. That one values culture at all is itself a sufficient reason for him to self-determinate according to the normative demands imposed by this culture; this is consistent with a Heraclitean conception of culture59. In any case, a Heraclitean conception of culture can still make normative demands to its people, but the demands are likely to be weak.
In this essay, I argue against Miller’s claim that a state is required for a nation as it grounds people’s need to self-determinate, his political proposition. To reach my position, it is sufficient to prove that people’s self-determination can be realised without the a priori state. I propose that we can realise people’s self-determination base on their national culture. If a culture is sufficiently normative, I believe, people’s self-determination follows autonomously for it is required of the people to verify and/or reaffirm whether they, in fact, are part of such culture. Such verification, or reaffirmation, to me, seems to be a great example of self-determination. Such form of self-determination is by no means political, but it can nevertheless have political ramifications.
Miller’s political proposition is misleading as it presupposes people’s self-determination has to be political. I see no reason for such assertion. More importantly, his position is more problematic to hold owing to his liberal standpoint. I believe a better way to encourage self-determination is by mean of culture. A common concern for adapting a cultural approach for a liberal is that of relativism; this, I answered, by invoking Brian Barry’s ingenious work. In the third section of this essay, I complimented culture’s normativity with tradition. Due to the limit of this paper, I could only sprint through many pieces of rich philosophical work. But I shall hope, nonetheless, that I have offered another explanation to national self-determination that is less abrupt and less demanding.
- Benhabib, Seyla. 2002. The Claims of Culture. Princeton University Press.
- Miller, David. 1995. On Nationality. Clarendon Press.
- Miller, David. 2013. Citizenship and National Identity. John Wiley & Sons.
- Pink, Thomas. 2016. Self-Determination. Oxford University Press.
- Rawls, John. 2001. The Law of Peoples. Harvard University Press.
- Scheffler, Samuel. 2012. Equality and Tradition. Oxford University Press.
- Miller, David. 1995. On Nationality. Clarendon Press, p.19 ↩
- . Ibid., p. 88 ↩
- On Nationality, op. cit. ch. 4 ↩
- Ibid., p. 10 ↩
- Ibid., p. 11 ↩
- Loc. cit. ↩
- Loc. cit. ↩
- Loc. cit. ↩
- Miller, David. 2013. Citizenship and National Identity. John Wiley & Sons, p.27 ↩
- In a practical sense, rather than theoretical. A theoretical state, by Miller’s definition, does not entail an institutional design. ↩
- As it is what genuinely determined by the people. ↩
- Miller notes that “If we could persuade people to discard ideas of nationality and to regard themselves simply as members of the human race, per haps with cultural affiliation to a particular group but nothing more than this, the world would be a freer and more peaceful place.”On Nationality, op. cit., p.13 ↩
- Non-willing here means that he is neither willing nor unwillingly. One example could be that he simply does not care (as much as he should) about the constraints imposed by the state. Constraints on liberty can be seen as decreased negative liberty (from interference). But if his exercise of liberty (positive) does not concern his diminished negative liberty, it seems that the impact on his negative liberty due to the state is trivial. Note, here I use Berlin’s distinction of positive/negative liberty. See, “Two Conceptions of Liberty” in Berlin, Isaiah, Henry Hardy, and Ian Harris. 2002. Liberty. Oxford University Press, USA. ↩
- Explicit consent contrast with tacit and hypothetical consent. Some argue that there can be no hypothetical consent. This essay is no place to settle the rich debate on the ethics of consent, and table hypothetical consent. See, e.g., Miller, Franklin. 2010. The Ethics of Consent. Oxford University Press, p. 19 (on tacit consent); p. 115 (on hypothetical consent). ↩
- Disapproving readers might think that my explanation here is too presumptuous. One might argue that liberal ideal should prioritise on righting the injustice created by non-arbitrary factors (e.g., nature)-that if one complain on his nationality, it is of priority for his complaint be dealt with. However, luck egalitarians argue that it is too demanding (if not impossible) to deal with all forms of luck, see, e.g.: Temkin, Larry S. 1993. Inequality. Oxford University Press. ↩
- It might be argued that culture and states rest on a par, that they both are non-arbitrary imposed onto individuals (e.g., when they were born). I think that the withdraw from culture is much less costly (and plausible) comparing to that of state, and as such, more problematic if we don’t treat it seriously. I shall visit this point later. ↩
- Miller concedes that, owing to the difference in people’s preference and their reasonable non-participation, the best way for state operation is by mean of democracy. On Nationality, op. cit., p. 89. ↩
- People that are born after the establishment of a basic state, for example, might reasonably claim that they do not concede with the state. They might do so on the ground of, for example, lack of consent, lack of sufficient knowledge, and so on. ↩
- On Nationality, op. cit., p. 120 ↩
- Ibid., pp. 121-124 ↩
- Ibid., pp. 122-123 ↩
- Ibid., p. 122 ↩
- It might be worthwhile to note that Miller’s theory of nationality is merely to explain and accommodate nationalism (rather than to persuade one into acquire it: p. 15), for he believes “nationalism is a phenomenon that we must simply accept as a fact of life.”, On Nationality, op. cit., p. 6 ↩
- For one can reasonably choose to not participate in a deliberation. This, to me, is a form of self-determination overlook by Miller’s Political proposition. ↩
- e.g., Pink, Thomas. 2016. Self-Determination. Oxford University Press, ch.3, 4, 7 ↩
- Barry, Brian. 2013. Culture and Equality. John Wiley & Sons, p. 265 ↩
- Claiming that no position is better/worse than another still require a comparison between this hypothetical position to an existing position. ↩
- Ibid. ↩
- Ibid., p. 253 ↩
- Ibid., p. 279 ↩
- Ibid., p. 284 ↩
- Ibid., p. 280 ↩
- Note, this simplistic case does not assume the exclusivity in values (e.g., human rights). Perhaps, the second case could carry some weightiness from human rights reason. But the point here is that the human right violation is not the main reason why murder is wrong in this particular context. ↩
- Of course, it can well be argued, morally, that what is of most importance is to do things for the right reason. However, given that our reasoning stems from a particular context, it seems demanding to presuppose, from the on-set, that any particular form of reasoning is “superior” or, “universal”. Indeed, “(o)nly a misunderstanding of the nature of liberal principles could lead anyone to imagine that they cannot countenance the legal enforcement of conventional norms.”. Ibid., p. 287 ↩
- Benhabib, Seyla. 2002. The Claims of Culture. Princeton University Press, p. 8 ↩
- Ibid., p. 49 ↩
- “Traditional reasons are neither normatively empty nor otiose.”, Ibid., p. 295 ↩
- Ibid., p. 291 ↩
- According to Scheffler, the list is non-exhaustive for establishing normative force of tradition. Ibid., p.295 ↩
- Scheffler, Samuel. 2012. Equality and Tradition. Oxford University Press, pp. 291-294 ↩
- Temporal mobility means the control of (the passage of) time, which we currently lack. pp. 295-296 ↩
- Given that we have no control over the passing time, Scheffler believes that with the arrival of every new unit of time, we feel estranged and in need of familiarity. Tradition is a source of such familiarity. Ibid., p. 297 ↩
- For Scheffler, the mere repetition of routine is insufficient to establish familiarity. For the purpose of making sense of the world, we also require the continuation of our own identity, that “…a person who exists at one time is the same person as a person who exists at another time.”, ibid., p. 298. For him, seeing one’s continuous identity answers to his identity concern, but also his existential concern. ↩
- Ibid., p. 303 ↩
- Ibid., p. 303 ↩
- Ibid., p. 304 ↩
- Ibid., p. 305. ↩
- “For culture is primarily a descriptive or ethnographic category, not a normative or deliberative one.”, Scheffler, Samuel. 2012. Equality and Tradition. Oxford University Press, p. 288, 309 ↩
- “Traditional reasons are neither normatively empty nor otiose.”, Ibid., p. 295 ↩
- Ibid., p. 281 ↩
- Ibid., p. 281 ↩
- Ibid., p. 282 ↩
- Ibid. ↩
- Scheffler gave no explanation in text regarding the meaning of this term. I therefore understand this term literally. ↩
- Ibid., p.267 ↩
- Ibid., p. 265 ↩
- Ibid., p. 279 ↩
- Even if we think that a particular culture is worthy of preservation. ↩
- “…culture and cultures are always in flux, individuals normally relate to culture through the acknowledgement of diverse practices, customs, and activities…” Ibid., p. 268 ↩